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Abstract
Inspired by the scope extrusion phenomenon of name passing calculi that allow to reason about knowledge of
(secret) names, we propose an abstract formulation of the concept of secret in any weakly adhesive category.
The guiding idea is to mark part of a system state as visible or publicly accessible; further, in principle,
something that has become public knowledge will stay accessible indeﬁnitely.
The main technical contribution consists in providing a proof which shows that a recently proposed
categorical construction, which produces a category having monomorphisms as objects and pullback squares
as morphisms, preserves weak adhesivity. Finally we sketch how it is possible to verify certain secrecy
properties using unfolding based veriﬁcation approaches that lately have been generalized to rewriting
systems in weakly adhesive categories.
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1 Introduction
In every day communication, private information is usually exchanged only between
communication partners that trust each other, as the consequences of public avail-
ability of private information tend to be numerous and subtle. In fact, more often
than not, one would rather prefer that a certain piece of private information will
never be become known to the public. Here we are not only talking about issues of
embarrassment or reputation, but also about secret data like personal identiﬁcation
numbers for (on-line) banking accounts.
Nevertheless, as the example of on-line banking illustrates, there often occur
situations in which secret data need to be transmitted via protected channels between
trustworthy communication partners, and moreover the critical data must not become
disclosed to a third party. The running example of this paper will be concerned
with access keys to a private network, e.g. the intranet of some banking institute.
Obviously, in this scenario, it is important that such access keys do not become
publicly available.
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One of the ﬁrst approaches to formally reason about the security of key exchange
protocols using cryptographic methods, is the spi-calculus [1], which extends the
π-calculus [14] by cryptographic primitives. Based on this name passing calculus,
there has been carried out a large amount of work concerning the veriﬁcation of
concrete protocols. The actual protocol veriﬁcation tools however do sometimes use
techniques from other ﬁelds of computer science (see e.g. [3]). Alternatively, protocols
might also be speciﬁed and veriﬁed using graph transformation systems [4,12]; the
latter have the advantage that they are often easier understandable by laypersons.
Now the aim of this paper is not another concrete proposal of a modelling
technique for protocols. Instead we strive for a better understanding of the funda-
mental distinction between private and public knowledge, which corresponds to the
open/bound names dichotomy of name passing calculi. Moreover the scope extrusion
phenomenon of the latter captures the possibility to exchange secret information
and, in the extreme, to make secret information publicly available.
Taking a more abstract point of view, given an arbitrary state of a system, then
part of of this state is open to public access (while at the same time other parts are
still secret). In the process calculus world, the open part corresponds to the free
names of a process. In graph transformations systems using the borrowed context
approach [5], the open part is singled out by a sub-graph of the graph which models
the whole system state.
The main question is now, when the private part and the public part (in the
model) of a given system state should be considered “suﬃciently” distinct such that
all secret information is protected from public access. Though this question usually
has an intuitive answer in concrete example cases, the question seems more diﬃcult
in the abstract setting of this paper, as we consider system states as objects of an
arbitrary (weakly) adhesive category.
To help answer this question, we proceed as follows. First we introduce the
protected links calculus as an toy example of a simple name passing calculus, which
nevertheless is suﬃciently rich to illustrate the private/public dichotomy and allows
to give a precise characterization of secrecy violations. Then we give the graphical
representation of this calculus in section 3. With these concrete examples at hand,
in section 4, we set out to lift the notion of secrecy violation to the abstract setting
of adhesive categories in such a way that the results of [2] apply.
2 The protected links calculus
The running example of this paper will be the protected links calculus (plc), which
couples the ideas of (the implementation of) the explicit fusion calculus [16] with
a basic access control mechanism. Recall that the explicit fusion calculus was
developed with the goal of providing an implementation of Milner’s π-calculus [14].
The “machine model” was the fusion machine described in [16]; a simpliﬁed version
of the latter has been proposed in [8], where also a “low-level” encoding of the
π-calculus was presented.
Now the main characteristic of the protected links calculus that it shares with
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the explicit fusion calculus and the fusion machine, is that it does not use any name
substitution at the meta-level but instead uses a “low-level” approach similar to the
one of the fusion machine. In the latter, substitution of names is implemented by a
forwarding mechanisms that was explored in more detail in [8].
Indeed, the major part of the primitives of the protected links calculus are taken
from the calculus of explicit fusions and its fusion machine, namely (asynchronous)
input and output, parallel composition, and forwarders, which we here more often
call links; the latter however are equipped with an access control mechanism based
on the notion of access right, which is the new entity kind of the plc.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Syntax of the protected links calculus) Let N be a collection
of names, which is the disjoint union of public names ¨N and private names ˆN,
which means N =¨N unionmultiˆN. Then the set of (raw) terms of the pl-calculus is given
by the following speciﬁcation.
P ::= u〈x〉 u, x ∈ N (output action)∣∣ u(y) u, y ∈ N (input action)∣∣ u− w u,w ∈ N (protected link)∣∣ xu x ∈ N, u ∈ˆN (access right)∣∣ 0 (inaction)∣∣ P |P (parallel composition)
Let P be a raw term; then the set of free names of P , written fnP , contains all
names that occur in P but are not private, i.e. fnP = {x ∈¨N | x occurs in P}.
A process of the pl-calculus is a raw term up to structural congruence, written ≡,
which is the smallest equivalence relation on raw terms satisfying the following axioms
where P,Q,R range over plc terms.
P | 0 ≡ P P |Q ≡ Q |P P | (Q |R) ≡ (P |Q) |R
If a name v is public, i.e. v ∈¨N, we sometimes write v¨ instead of v to emphasize
this fact; conversely, if v¨ is a name, then we implicitly assume that v¨ ∈ ¨N; by a
similar convention, if we write vˆ, then we silently presuppose that vˆ ∈ˆN.
As mentioned above, the main diﬀerence w.r.t the calculus of explicit fusions
consists in the new entity, called access right. Following a common interpretation of
process calculi, names are often referred to as channels through which input and
output actions may synchronise and communicate. Further we will talk about scopes,
which are those parts of terms that share a private name uˆ, or names that are related
to uˆ via a chain of bi-directional links, i.e. uˆ and v are in the same scope, if there is
a chain uˆ− w1 |w1− uˆ | · · · v− wn |wn− v. Relying on this word usage, the ideas of the
protected links calculus can be described as follows.
The protection mechanism of links ensures that an output action can enter into
a scope only if it has the access right for the scope in question. This is captured by
the conditional forwarding mechanism of protected links, which checks access rights
before output actions are relocated. In contrast, modelling the possibility of attacks
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and careless users, access rights may always spread between linked channels. These
phenomena are made precise in the formal deﬁnition of the reaction relation over
plc terms, and is discussed in more detail afterwards.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Reaction in the PLC) The reaction relation over plc terms,
written , is the smallest relation satisfying the axioms and rules of Figure 1.
prot
vˆ ∈ˆN
(u〈x〉 |xvˆ |u− vˆ)  (vˆ〈x〉 |xvˆ |u− vˆ)
pub
v¨ ∈¨N
(u〈x〉 |u− v¨)  (v¨〈x〉 |u− v¨)
exch
(xvˆ |x− y)  (yvˆ |x− y)
comm
(u〈x〉 |u(y))  (x− y | y− x)
struct
P ≡ P ′ P ′  Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
P  Q
Fig. 1. Reaction rules of the protected links calculus
These axioms and rules can be explained as follows. The protection mechanism
of links is captured by the prot-axiom: an output action u〈x〉 is forwarded along a
link u− vˆ only if the data x come equipped with the access right xvˆ to the channel
vˆ, to which the action could be transported via the link. To simplify the modelling
process we think of the data x as a representation of the actual user that is trying
to send x.
However, the protection mechanism does not restrict transmissions to public
channels, i.e. everyone can send on public channels. This is formalized by the
pub-rule, which says that given a link u− v¨, which models a direct network link
connecting u to v¨, an output action u〈x〉 at the origin u can always travel to the
target v¨, provided that the target channel v¨ is a public.
Next we come to the formal counterpart of the phenomenon that, as known from
practical experience, keys are often stolen or exchanged with untrustworthy partners.
Hence, assuming the worst case, the distribution of access keys is unconditional,
i.e. whenever there is a direct means of communication a key may be exchanged.
Precisely the exch-axiom says that whenever the user x has a key to enter the scope
v, modelled by the access right xvˆ, in the presence of a link x− y, which models a
direct means of communication, the user y will always manage to obtain the “key”
granting access to v, which then results in the access right yvˆ.
A request for a (new) channel for the transmission of (possibly conﬁdential) data
is modelled by a send action u〈x〉 where x is a channel name which, simplifying again,
is thought of as the user issuing the channel request. The receiver, corresponding
to the input action u(y), then will establish direct links between x and y, which is
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represented by complementary forwarders x− y and y− x; the described communication
protocol is captured by the comm-axiom. Note, that this axiom is essentially the
same as the single reaction axiom of the calculus of explicit fusions [16]. Finally the
struct-rule says that reaction is closed under structural congruence.
Example 2.3 (Key exchange) To show the pl-calculus at work, we consider key
exchange. That a user xˆ has a key granting access to vˆ is modelled by the access
right xˆvˆ. Now suppose user xˆ wants to exchange this key with user yˆ and that xˆ
and yˆ usually communicate via channel u, possibly a private channel as well. The
plc process xˆvˆ |u〈xˆ〉 |u(yˆ) is a possible solution to achieve this, as we have the
following reactions.
xˆvˆ |u〈xˆ〉 |u(yˆ)  xˆvˆ | xˆ− yˆ | yˆ− xˆ (comm)
 yˆvˆ | xˆ− yˆ | yˆ− xˆ (exch)
Hence after these two steps, user yˆ has the key granting access to vˆ, which is modelled
by the access right yˆvˆ.
Before we come to the main theme of this paper, namely secrecy, we give a short
comparison of the pl-calculus on the one hand, and the calculus of explicit fusions,
the fusion machine and the linear forwarder calculus on the other hand. The only
properly new primitive of the pl-calculus is the access right since the fusion related
calculi do not have any similar entities; however the latter calculi are not designed
to reason about secrecy but only about communication via name passing.
The second theme which allows to discern the mentioned calculi concerns the
mechanisms that are used to connect channels or “fuse” names. Whereas the calculus
of explicit fusions addresses the issue of connection of names at the level of structural
congruence, which intuitively corresponds to (irreversible) fusion of names, both
the linear forwarder calculus [8] and the protected links calculus choose a “low-level”
approach, and add reaction rules that “implement” the fusion of names; this “low-
level” approach has the advantage, that additional reaction rules might be added to
model the break down of network links, which corresponds to the removal of links
between names.
Finally we would like to stress that the pl-calculus is just an example which
allows to illustrate the idea of secrecy without the need to formally introduce the
technical details of double pushout rewriting [6]. Hence we also omitted replication,
and synchronous input and output, which only would have burdened the presentation.
Moreover, for the purpose of this paper, it seemed suitable to avoid the notions of
α-equivalence and bound name.
Summarizing, the pl-calculus can be seen as a simpliﬁed version of the linear
forwarder calculus with a new entity called access right. The latter allows to reason
about secrecy, as demonstrated in the following, central example of the paper, which
illustrates how secrecy holes are modelled in the pl-calculus.
Example 2.4 (Secrecy hole) A secrecy hole of a network, is a channel through
which private access keys are made public. A process term P contains an immediate
secrecy hole, if P contains a sub-term of the form v¨wˆ, i.e. if in the modelled system,
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there is a publicly available key granting access to some private channel wˆ.
Further a process Q models a system with a covert secrecy hole, if Q does not
contain any sub-term of the form v¨wˆ but such a sub-term might arise after a
number of reductions of P . For example the process uˆwˆ | uˆ− v¨ does not contain any
immediate secrecy hole; however we have the reaction (uˆwˆ | uˆ− v¨)  (v¨wˆ | uˆ− v¨)
via the exch-rule, and the latter contains an immediate secrecy hole. Hence, given a
term Q one might want to prove that it does not contain any (covert) secrecy holes.
We would like to emphasize that we do not claim that this is the only class of secrecy
holes that might be worthwhile to investigate.
How the veriﬁcation of secrecy w.r.t this “deﬁnition” may be achieved using the
unfolding technique of [2], is sketched in 4.6. However we ﬁrst need to recall the
necessary concepts concerning transformation systems and categories that allow to
model systems following the double pushout approach of [6].
3 The graphical counterpart of the PLC
In this section we give a graphical representation of the plc; more precisely, for each
process there will be a corresponding graph and vice versa. Moreover each reaction
rule will be a graph transformation rule based on the double pushout approach
(dpo) [6]. However, omitting the details of dpo rewriting, we give an informal
presentation that nevertheless should convey the main ideas of graph transformation.
The channels or names of plc processes will correspond to nodes in the graphical
representation. All entities of the pl-calculus correspond to diﬀerent kinds of edges
between the nodes. An output action u〈x〉 is represented by a send arrow x u ,
an input action u(y) corresponds to a receive edge u y , an access right xuˆ is
drawn as x uˆ , a link u− w becomes a connection arc u w , and the inaction is
the empty graph ∅. Finally parallel composition is achieved by union of graphs. To
avoid clutter, a pair of complementary links u− w |w− u is represented by u w . For
a private node uˆ , the label uˆ already contains the information that this is a private
node, and the gray boundary only emphasizes this fact.
Moreover, not only does each process correspond to a graph, but also each reaction
rule has a corresponding transformation rule. A (linear) graph transformation
rule or production q is essentially a pair of graphs L,R (called left- and right-
hand side, respectively) with a common sub-graph K (referred to as interface), i.e.
q = L ⊇ K ⊆ R. Assuming that the sets of nodes and edges in rules are disjoint,
and writing as if graphs were mere sets, the rewriting mechanism of such rules can
be described as follows.
Suppose that the left-hand side L of a rule q = L ⊇ K ⊆ R is a sub-graph of
some larger graph G, i.e. L ⊆ G, then the rule q ﬁrst removes from G all those
nodes and edges that are covered by the left-hand side L but not contained in the
interface K, which results in an intermediate graph D ⊆ G; in a second step, those
nodes and edges of R that are not contained in K are adjoined to the intermediate
result D, yielding a graph H ⊇ D. Provided that R ∩ G ⊆ K (and the inclusion
L ⊆ G satisﬁes the so-called dangling condition [4]), the result H can be described
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as H = (G \ (L \K)) ∪R.
Now the graphical counterpart of the rules of the plc is illustrated in Figure 2.
Note that in this encoding of the plc rules, one directly mentions which resources
prot:
x
u vˆ
⊇
x
u vˆ
⊆
x
u vˆ
pub:
x
u v¨
⊇
x
u v¨
⊆
x
u v¨
exch:
vˆ
x y
⊇
vˆ
x y
⊆
vˆ
x y
comm:
v
x y
⊇
v
x y
⊆
v
x y
Fig. 2. The graphical representation of the plc calculus
are only used as “catalysts”, and hence remain unchanged during the reactions. To
see the correspondence between the calculus and its graphical presentation, consider
the following example concerning the comm-rule.
Example 3.1 (Communication in PLC via graphs) The protected link calculus
process u(y) |u〈x〉 |u(z) has two possibilities to evolve: either u〈x〉 reacts with u(y) or
with u(z), i.e.
(y− x |x− y |u(z))  (u(y) |u〈x〉 |u(z))  (u(y) | z− x |x− z)
The corresponding graph transformation steps can be illustrated as follows.
v
x
y z
⊇ v
x
y z
⊆ v
x
y z
v
x
y z
⊇ v
x
y z
⊆ v
x
y z
⊇ ⊇ ⊇ ⊇ ⊇ ⊇
v
x
y z
⊇ v
x
y z
⊆ v
x
y z
⊇ v
x
y z
⊆ v
x
y z
So far we have not elaborated on the concept of graph we have actually used in
this encoding. As a starting point, we will work with suitably labelled graphs.To
emphasize that the set of public nodes is actually a fully ﬂedged sub-graph of the
graph which represents the whole process, we will later use marked graphs instead;
the latter are pairs of a graph an a marked sub-graph (see Deﬁnition 3.2). The use
of marked graphs is motivated by the fact that the notion of sub-graph allows for a
straightforward categorical generalization, viz. sub-object, whereas this is not the
case for labels. In the end, marking of objects might be thought of as an abstract
labelling mechanism.
3.1 The graphical representation in a slice category
A suitable choice of a category for a precise, graphical presentation of processes of
the protected links calculus is the category of graphs typed 1 over the type graph
1 This terminolgoy is in accordance with the theory and applications of graph grammars, see e.g.
http://tfs.cs.tu-berlin.de/agg/typegraph.html.
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T = ∈ G,
i.e. processes correspond to objects of the slice category G↓T where G is the usual
category of directed multi-graphs (see Deﬁnition A.1 in Appendix A). In the graph T ,
the left node corresponds to public channels, the right one to private ones, the three
loops on the left node stand for inputs, outputs and links between pairs of public
names, respectively, the four loops on the right one represent inputs, outputs,
links, and access rights between pairs of private channels, respectively, and similar
explanations can be provided for the remaining edges between the two diﬀerent
nodes. This means that the G↓T -object T−idTT would be depicted as
¨ ˆ .
Note that this formal rendering in the slice category G↓T means that Figure 2
actually gives schemes for rules, since it is not speciﬁed for several nodes whether
they are public or private, i.e. whether they are mapped to ¨ or ˆ in T ; in other
words there are actually eight diﬀerent instances of the comm-rule, and four instances
for each of the other rules.
In this formal setting, a secrecy violation v¨ wˆ is an object of G↓T , which can
also be seen as a sub-graph of T , corresponding to the obvious graph morphism
c : v¨ wˆ  T in G. Further, observe that a (typed) graph (A−aT ) ∈ G↓T does
not contain any secrecy violation v¨ wˆ , i.e. there does not exist any monomorphism
v¨ wˆ  (A−aT ) in G↓T , if and only if pulling back along c yields a discrete graph
(in the slice category G↓ v¨ wˆ ). More general, given any graph (B−bT ) ∈ G↓T
representing some pl-process P , pulling back along c : v¨ wˆ  T followed by
post-composition with c yields the secrecy relevant part of (B−bT ).
This pullback-compose construction can be generalized to any graph morphism
ϕ : T ′ → T in G, and actually gives rise to functors ϕ : G↓T → G↓T which act by
pulling back along ϕ followed by post-composition with ϕ, i.e. ϕ = Σϕ ◦ ϕ∗ where
ϕ∗ : G↓T → G↓T ′ and Σϕ : G↓T ′ → G↓T are a choice of a pullback functor and its
left adjoint, respectively. The co-unit ε : ϕ → idG↓T of this adjunction Σϕ  ϕ∗
embeds the secrecy relevant part of an G↓T -object.
In the same way, the public part of an object (A−aT ) ∈ G↓T is given by i(a)
where i : ¨  T is the inclusion morphism mapping the single node to the left node
of T . As i is a monomorphism, also the co-unit ε : i  idG↓T is monic. Hence ε
gives for each typed graph (A−aT ) the embedding εa : i(a)  a of its public part
into the whole object. This exactly corresponds to the free names of a process if
(A−aT ) arose from a pl-process. Abstracting away from the functors i and c,
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we thus lead to the following alternative labelling mechanism.
3.2 Marking graphs
An alternative to attribution, labelling or typing of graphs is the idea to “mark”
part of a given graph. This idea has been discussed recently within the graph
transformation community and is presented in detail in [10]. In the present case, one
might for example choose to mark only the public nodes of a graph, i.e. the objects
we are working with are pairs 〈G,G′〉 such that G ⊇ G′. In the next section we
will replace graphs by objects of any (weakly) adhesive category. Hence the details
about the graphs that we will use are deferrred to the end of this section.
The main idea of the graphical presentation of pl-calculus terms is as follows: let
P be a plc term and let P  be the presentation of P , which is an (edge and node
labelled) graph. Then the public nodes of P form the set of free names fnP , which
is – when considered as a discrete graph, i.e. a graph without edges – a sub-graph
of P , i.e. the pair 〈P , fnP 〉 satisﬁes P  ⊇ V ′.
For the remainder of the section we write 〈G,G′〉⊇ if G and G′ are graphs, such
that the inclusion G ⊇ G′ holds, and call the pair 〈G,G′〉⊇ a marked graph. Next
we will supply as suitable notion of morphism between marked graphs, such that
the marked part of a graph will remain marked and moreover the marked and the
unmarked part will be kept distinct. This is made formal in the next deﬁnition for
the case of (unlabelled multi-)graphs.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Marked Graph) A marked graph is a pair G⊇ = 〈G,G′〉⊇ of
graphs G and G′ such G′ is a sub-graph of G, i.e. G ⊆ G′. A marked graph
mapping between marked graphs G⊇ = 〈G,G′〉⊇ and H⊇ = 〈H,H ′〉⊇ is a pair of
graph morphisms f⊇ = 〈f : G → H, f ′ : G′ → H ′〉 such that ıH ◦f ′ = f ◦ıG is satisﬁed
where ıH : H ′ H and ıG : G′ G are the inclusion morphisms and moreover
(i) if the image of a node v of G is in the marked part H ′, then the node itself is
marked, i.e. for every node v of G, if fV (v) ∈ H ′ then v ∈ G′, and
(ii) the same holds for all edges e in G, i.e. fE(e) ∈ H ′ implies e ∈ G′.
A marked graph mapping f⊇ = 〈f, f ′〉 is an inclusion mapping if f and f ′ are
inclusion morphisms.
To prepare the deﬁnition of the category of reﬂected monos, we give a categorical
characterization of the category of marked graphs and mappings. For this we recall
that, given a graph H, a sub-graph H ′ ⊆ H, and a morphism f : G → H in the
category of graphs and graph morphisms, the (natural choice of a) pullback of
the co-span G −fH 	ı
H ′ is the span G 	ı
 f−1(H ′) −fH′H ′, giving rise to
the pullback square f
−1(H′)
G
↑

→
→
↑H′
H where f
−1(|H ′|) = {h ∈ |G| | f(h) ∈ |H ′|} is the
pre-image of |H ′|, and the graph morphism fH′ : f−1(H ′) → H ′ is the co-domain
restriction of f : G → H, which maps x ∈ f−1(|H ′|) to fH′(x) = f(x) ∈ |H ′|.
Lemma 3.3 (Marked mappings as pullback squares) Let G⊇ = 〈G,G′〉⊇ and
H⊇ = 〈H,H ′〉⊇ be marked graphs and f⊇ = 〈f, f ′〉 : G⊇ → H⊇ be a marked graph
mapping. Then G′ = f−1(H ′) and f ′ = fH′ , which means that G	ı
G′ −f ′H ′ is
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a pullback of G −fH 	ı
H ′, giving rise to the pullback square G′G ↑

→
→
↑H′
H .
Proof. First we show that G′ = f−1(H ′). To show that G′ ⊆ f−1(H ′), let x ∈ |G′|;
then f(x) = f ′(x) ∈ |H ′|, i.e. x ∈ f−1(|H ′|). To prove the converse, let x ∈ f−1(|H ′|),
i.e. f(x) ∈ |H ′|, whence also x ∈ G′ by Deﬁnition 3.2. Having shown this, the
equation f ′ = fH′ follows immediately.  
Marked graphs and their mappings satisfy a certain reﬂection property, namely
for any given mapping 〈f, f ′〉 : 〈G,G′〉⊇ → 〈H,H ′〉⊇, the marked part G′ can be
recovered from its image, i.e. the equation |G′| = f−1(f(|G′|)) holds.
4 A categorical approach to secrecy
Having introduced the protected links calculus to motivate the notion of marked
graph, we now set out to lift the latter notion to an abstract level, namely the
so-called categories of reﬂected monos [10]. This is followed by suggestions for the
description of secrecy related concepts using category theoretical language. Finally
we discuss possibilities to verify secrecy properties on this abstract level.
4.1 Categories of reﬂected monos
Using Lemma 3.3, the idea of the category of marked graphs and their mappings can
easily transferred to any category, by the reﬂected monos construction. This lemma
at the same time illustrates the main diﬀerence between categories of reﬂected monos
and the arrow category G→, more precisely to the full subcategory of the arrow
category G→ having the class of all G-monomorphisms as objects.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Reﬂected Monos) Let C be a category with pullbacks along mono-
morphisms, i.e. for each co-span A −fD 	m
M with monic m, a pullback span
A	n
N −gM exists, yielding a pullback square AD ↑

→
→
↑ N
M .
Then the category of reﬂected C-monos, written RMon(C), has C-monomorphisms
A′aA as objects and an RMon(C)-morphism f : (A′aA) → (B′bB) is a
pair f = 〈f : A → B, f ′ : A′ → B′〉 of C-morphisms such that A	a
A′ −f ′B′ is
a pullback of A −fB 	b
B′, yielding a pullback square A′A ↑

→
→
↑B′
B .
The category of reﬂected monos RMon(C) comes equipped with a forgetful
functor   : RMon(C) → C which maps each monomorphism A′ a A to A, i.e.
a = A, and each morphism f = 〈f : A → B, f ′ : A′ → B′〉 to f , i.e. 〈f, f ′〉 = f .
4.2 Reﬂected monos in weakly adhesive categories
We will now recapitulate the notion of weakly adhesive category presented in [2],
which provides a framework that is suitable for double pushout rewriting, and
moreover is compatible with the RMon construction, a fact which will be made precise
in Proposition 4.4. Weakly adhesive categories generalize adhesive categories [13]
and are closely related to weak adhesive hlr categories [7]. The advantage of this
weaker notion of adhesivity lays in the fact that it captures additional examples, e.g.
those presented in [7], which are of practical relevance.
T. Heindel / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 229 (2009) 97–115106
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Weakly adhesive category) A category is weakly adhesive if
(i) pullbacks along monomorphisms exist and also pushouts along monomorphisms
exist, i.e. for each span B	f−AmC with monic m, a pushout B−nD	g−C
exists, yielding a pushout square BD ↓
←
←↓ AC;
(ii) pushouts of pairs of monomorphisms are universal (or stable under pullback),
i.e. in each commutative cube over a pushout square B←A↘↘D←C having pullback
squares as lateral faces as shown in the middle diagram in the display below,
the top face is a pushout square;
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
i m
a
b c
i′ m
′
n′
n
d
j′
j
⇒
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
i m
a
b c
i′ m
′
n′
n
d
j′
j
⇒
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
i m
a
b c
i′ m
′
n′
n
d
j′
j
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(iii) pushouts along monomorphisms are mono-universal and converse mono-uni-
versal: in each commutative cube on top of a pushout square B←A↘↘D←C as in the
left diagram in the display below, with pullback squares as back faces and the
“corner”-arrows b and c monic, its top face is a pushout square if and only if
the front faces are pullback squares and the morphism d is monic.
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f m
a
b c
f ′ m′
n′
n
d
g′
g
⇒
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f m
a
b c
f ′ m′
n′
n
d
g′
g
⇒
⇐
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f m
a
b c
f ′ m′
n′
n
d
g′
g
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Note that adhesive categories [13], apart from having all pullbacks, satisfy the simpler
(and stronger) version of Condition iii that does not contain any conditions on the
vertical morphisms a, b, c and d. Condition iii is equivalent to the requirement that
pushouts along monomorphisms are hereditary in the sense of [11]. Finally, the subtle
diﬀerence to the weak adhesive hlr-categories of [7] is that in the deﬁnition of the
latter, the vertical morphism d into the “tip” of the bottom pushout is required to be
monic already in the antecedent, which implies the “top face-front faces”-equivalence.
This is also the reason why the proof of Proposition 4.4 does carry over to weak
adhesive hlr-categories. The exact relation among weakly adhesive, adhesive, and
weak adhesive hlr categories is also discussed in [2].
An example of a category that is weakly adhesive but not adhesive and hence
deserves being mentioned, is the category of undirected multi-graphs. That this
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category is weakly adhesive but not adhesive can be shown by adapting the results
presented in [15].
Example 4.3 (Undirected multigraphs) An undirected multigraph is a triple
M = 〈E, V, c : E → V ⊕〉, where V ⊕ is the free commutative monoid over the
set of vertices V and the connection function c assigns to each edge e ∈ E
a multiset c(e) ∈ V ⊕ of adjacent vertices. Finally, given another multigraph
M ′ = 〈E′, V ′, c′ : E′ → V ′⊕〉, a multigraph morphism f : M → M ′ is a pair of
functions (fE : E → E′, fV : V → V ′) : M → M ′ such that f⊕V ◦ c = c′ ◦ fE where the
homomorphism f⊕V : V
⊕ → E⊕ is the freely adjoined monoid homomorphism of the
function fV : V → E.
Now we come to the main technical contribution of this paper, which says that
the RMon construction yields a weakly adhesive categories when applied to a weakly
adhesive category.
Proposition 4.4 (Weakly adhesive reﬂected monos) Let C be a weakly adhe-
sive category. Then the category of reﬂected monos RMon(C) is weakly adhesive.
Proof. First one shows that a morphism f = 〈f, f ′〉 : a → b in RMon(C) is monic,
if and only if both f and f ′ are monic in C. Moreover it is straightforward to show
that pullbacks along monomorphisms are constructed component-wise.
The main task of the proof consists in showing that also pushouts along monomor-
phisms are constructed component-wise. Given a morphism f = 〈f, f ′〉 : a → b
and a monomorphism m = 〈m,m′〉 : a → c, then the candidate for the pushout
directly arises from the deﬁnition of weakly adhesive categories.
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
f m
a
b c
f ′ m′
n g

B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f m
a
b c
f ′ m′
n′
d
n
g′
g
⇒
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f m
a
b c
f ′ m′
n′
n
d
g′
g
It remains to show that this square satisﬁes the universal property of pushouts.
Hence let 〈h, h′〉 : b → e and 〈k, k′〉 : c → e be morphisms such that the left one of
the following C-diagrams commutes.
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B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f
m
a
b c
f ′
m′
n′
n
d
g′
g
E
E′
e
k′
k
h′
h
⇒
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D′
f
m
a
b c
f ′
m′
n′
n
d
g′
g
E
E′
e
k′
k
h′
h
u′
u
Now we obtain a pair of morphisms u′ : D′ → E′ and u : D → E such that the right
one of these diagrams commutes, since {n′, g′} are jointly epic. It remains to show
that the pair u′, u actually deﬁnes a mediating morphism as it then is easy to show
that it is unique.
To derive existence, let E′ 	u¯− D¯ d¯D be a pullback of E′ e E 	u− D as
shown in the left one of the following diagrams.
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D¯
f
m
a
b c
f ′
m′
n¯
n
d¯
g¯
g
E
E′
e
k′
k
h′
h
u¯
u
⇒
B C
A
D
B′ C ′
A′
D¯
f
m
a
b c
f ′
m′
n¯
n
d¯
g¯
g
E
E′
e
k′
k
h′
h
u¯
u
Now there exist unique C-morphisms n¯ : B′ → D¯ and g¯ : C ′ → D¯ making this
C-diagram commute, which moreover yield pullback squares as illustrated. Then,
by the deﬁnition of weakly adhesive category, the co-span B′ n¯ D¯ 	g¯− C ′ is
a pushout of the span B′ 	f ′− A′ m′ C ′ as indicated in the right one of the
above diagrams. Finally, by straightforward calculation, we obtain an isomorphism
i : D′ → D¯ satisfying both u′ = u¯ ◦ i and d = d¯ ◦ i, i.e. 〈u, u′〉 : d → e is actually a
mediating morphism.  
Thus we have laid the foundations for discussing the notions of secret and secrecy
on an abstract level. To illustrate the idea, we turn back to Example 2.4, and the
discussion of secrecy holes in systems that are modelled using the pl-calculus.
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4.3 Secrecy violations revisited
Having established the theoretical framework, namely reﬂected monos in weakly
adhesive categories, we are now ready to study secrecy related phenomena at a more
abstract level. In particular we address the questions of how to describe secrecy holes,
of when the private/public separation might be violated, and of how persistence of
public information can be ensured.
As for the ﬁrst point, recall that an immediate secrecy hole in a plc process P
is witnessed by a sub-term of the form v¨wˆ, which corresponds to the fact, that the
encoding P  as sketched in section 3 contains a sub-graph of the form v¨ wˆ . More
precisely, the graphical representation of P is actually a marked graph 〈P , fnP 〉⊇
and also v¨ wˆ is a marked graph, namely 〈 v¨ wˆ , v¨ 〉⊇. Moreover P has an (imme-
diate) secrecy hole if and only if the inclusion 〈 v¨ wˆ , v¨ 〉⊇ ⊆ 〈P , fnP 〉⊇ holds in
the category of marked graphs, which is the case if v¨ wˆ is a sub-graph of P  and
v¨ ∈ fnP .
Now, the ﬁrst observation is that the marked graph 〈 v¨ wˆ , v¨ 〉⊇ is an object
of the category of marked graphs that witnesses a secrecy violation. Hence on the
abstract level, given a category D and a system with states being modelled as objects
of the category D, then a state S ∈ D will have a secrecy violation V ∈ D if there
is a monomorphism m : V  S. This leaves us the task of motivating, for the case
of D = RMon(C), when an object W ′wW ∈ RMon(C) should be considered as a
secrecy violation.
4.4 An abstract characterization of secrecy violations
We assume that in applications it is usually clear which parts of a given system are
secrecy relevant. This assumption seems harmless in the case of (on-line) banking,
where personal identiﬁcation numbers are clearly secrecy relevant data, and similarly
it is obvious that private keys that are used in (asymmetric) cryptographic protocols
should remain secret.
The process of pointing out the secrecy relevant part of a state is formalized
by a certain functor R : D → RMon(D) which marks the respective part of each
object A ∈ D. It is clear that R should satisfy the equation   ◦ R = idD (see
the paragraph after Deﬁnition 4.1 for   : RMon(D) → D), which means that the
application of R really yields a monomorphism into any given object A ∈ D. For
the case of D = RMon(C), the value R(a) : m a at an object A′aA ∈ RMon(C),
is a C-pullback square A′A
↑

→
→
↑ M′
M ; with some abuse of notation, we often will write
A′
A
↑

→
→
↑ RA′
RA in such a situation.
The general idea of a secrecy violation in the category RMon(C) w.r.t. to a
suitable functor R : RMon(C) → RMon2(C), i.e. R satisﬁes   ◦ R = idRMon(C), is as
follows. Given a state modelled by an object S′sS ∈ RMon(C) with associated
secrecy relevant part R(s) : m  s, resulting in a pullback square S′S
↑

→
→
↑ M′
M , the
(completely) private part of the secrecy relevant part M is represented by the
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(pseudo-)complement 2 m : M ′ M of m : M ′ M (which exists if the subobject
poset over M in C is ﬁnite or the category C is suﬃciently rich). Now secrecy
relevant information is kept private in s provided that M is actually a coproduct
M ′ m M ′ + M¯ ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
	m¯
 M¯ ′
and there exists some C-arrow  : M ′  M¯ ′ satisfying m = m¯ ◦ . This condition
appears to be compatible with the intuition that the (secrecy relevant) private and
public data should be located in disjoint parts of the state.
Conversely, a secrecy violation is an object V ′vV ∈ RMon(C) with secrecy
relevant part R(v) : n  v such that either the pseudo-complement n : N ′ N is
not a co-product injection, or if N ′ nN 	n¯
 N¯ ′ is a co-product then n¯ does not
factor through n, i.e. there is no  such that n¯ ◦  = n.
The running example of the paper can be regained by taking the slice category
G↓T for C. As mentioned in subsection 3.1, taking the “pullback” of a typed graph
AtT ∈ G↓T along the G-morphism i : ¨ T gives rise to an RMon(G↓T )-object
as follows: after constructing the G-pullback ¨ 	t′−A′aA of ¨ iT	a−A, which
gives rise to a pullback square A′©··
↑

→
→
↑A
T , we can deﬁne the RMon(G↓T ) counterpart
of AtT as a : (i ◦ t′)  t.
This “pullback” construction can be generalized to any monomorphism ϕ : T ′T
in G, and actually gives rise to functors ϕ : G↓T → RMon(G↓T ) which act
by pulling back along ϕ followed by post-composition with ϕ; functoriality is
a consequence of the universal properties of pullbacks. In the same way, the
“global” secrecy relevant part of an G↓T -object is obtained by applying the functor
c : G↓T → RMon(G↓T ) where c is the “inclusion” v¨ wˆ  T in G.
Having the two functors c and i at our disposal, we obtain, for each G↓T -object
S, an RMon(G↓T )-object i(S) = S′sS with a marked public part, and a (global)
secrecy relevant part c(S) = M  S; taking the pullback S′ 	′
M ′ mM
of S′ s S 	
M results in the expected pullback square S′S
↑

→
→
↑ M′
M . The technical
details of the deﬁnition of a suitable functor R : RMon(G↓T ) → RMon2(G↓T ) based
on these pullback constructions are numerous but straightforward.
The fact that the typed graph v¨ wˆ is a secrecy violation can now be recovered
by inspecting the pullback square
v¨ w ← v¨ w
↓ ↓
v¨ wˆ ← v¨ wˆ
,
since the pseudo-complement wˆ  v¨ wˆ of the monomorphism v¨  v¨ wˆ is not
a co-product injection.
2 See for example [9] for a deﬁnition.
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We remark that the proposed notion of secrecy violation is intimitely related
with the private/public distinction. Moreover we are “only” studying those secrecy
holes, that have a “topological” or structural representation of the described kind;
hence, though it does not appear to be very strict, this restriction needs to be kept
in mind during the system modelling process.
We would also like to remark once more that the goal of this paper is not a
proposal of a new “concrete” technique: for practical applications working with
typed graphs, i.e. with objects of G↓T , is usually suﬃcient. However, in a manner
of speaking, the category G↓T has too much structure which is not directly relevant.
The aim of this paper now consists in the exploration of ways to describe the
“essentials” of secrecy related phenomena using the language of category theory.
4.5 Dynamic aspects
So far we have only spoken about properties of system states, modelled as objects
of categories of reﬂected monos, and gave suggestions of how to determine whether
private and public areas are disjoint in a given state. However we might also want
to reason about the dynamic evolution of a given system.
For example one might ask whether public information will always stay available,
or whether it may eventually be lost; this question concerns the transformation rules
of the system. Recall that a rule R 	α
K β R in a category C is non-deleting
if α is an isomorphism. Now, a simple suﬃcient condition which ensures that a rule
l	〈ı,ı′〉
 k 〈j,j′〉 r in the category RMon(C) leaves all public information untouched
is the requirement that ı′ is an isomorphism since this corresponds to the fact that
every application of this rule does not delete anything in the public part of the state
to which the rule is applied.
4.6 Verifying secrecy properties
We have argued that (at least in certain cases) it is possible to model secrecy violations
as objects which have a structure that models disclosure of private information,
the prime example being the marked graph 〈 v¨ wˆ , v¨ 〉⊇ in the context of the
graphical representation of the protected links calculus (see Figure 2). In analogy,
suppose that the RMon2(C)-object V
′
V
↑

→
→
↑ RV ′
RV models a secrecy violation where C is
a weakly adhesive category and R : RMon(C) → RMon2(C) is a “secrecy relevance”
functor. Now, as the results of [2] apply (because RMon2(C) is weakly adhesive by
Proposition 4.4), one can in principle verify that in a system that is modelled by
a set of rules {qn = ln 	
 kn  rn | n = 1, . . . ,m} and an object S ∈ RMon2(C)
corresponding to the start state, there is no reachable system state with a secrecy
violation, i.e. the system does not have (structural) secrecy holes.
Speaking in Petri net terms, the object V ′V
↑

→
→
↑ RV ′
RV corresponds to a marking, the
rules {qn = ln 	
 kn  rn | n ∈ N} with a start object S in the category RMon2(C)
together correspond to a marked Petri net. The fact that no reachable object contains
V ′
V
↑

→
→
↑ RV ′
RV is in analogy to the fact that a given “bad” marking is not coverable in
the marked Petri net. Further, in the long rung, the results of [2] might lead to
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generalizations of the methods for Petri nets and graph transformation systems
(cf. [12]), that allow to automatically verify that a “bad” marking is not coverable.
5 Conclusion
Based on the recently proposed reﬂected monos-construction of [10], we have dis-
cussed possibilities for abstract, formal counterparts of secrecy related notions, that
allow to reason about secret keeping in systems that are faithfully modelled by trans-
formation systems in categories of reﬂected monos. To ensure that transformation
systems in categories of reﬂected monos can be given in terms of double pushout
rewriting [6], we have established that the reﬂected monos construction preserves
weak adhesivity in the sense of [2]. Finally, we have sketched how the results of the
latter work might eventually lead to automatic veriﬁcation of secrecy properties,
working on the abstract level of weakly adhesive categories.
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A Basic Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition A.1 (Graphs and morphisms, marked graphs and mappings)
An unlabelled multi-graph is a quadruple G = 〈V,E, s, t〉 where V is the set of
nodes, E is the set of edges and s, t : E → V are the source and target functions,
respectively, which assign to each edge the source and target of the edge, respectively.
W.l.o.g. we assume that nodes and edges are a pair of disjoint sets, i.e. E ∩ V = ∅;
then the carrier of G can be deﬁned as the set |G| := E ∪ V .
Next, a graph morphism between two graphs G = 〈V,E, s, t〉 and G′ = 〈V ′, E′, s′, t′〉
is a pair of functions f = 〈fV : V → V ′, fE : E → E′〉 such that the following two
diagrams commute
E
V
E′
V ′
fE
fV
s s′
E
V
E′
V ′
fE
fV
t t′ ,
i.e. the two equations fE ◦ s′ = s ◦ fV and fE ◦ t′ = t ◦ fV are satisﬁed; such a
morphism f corresponds to a unique carrier function |f | : |G| → |G′|.
Given a graph G = 〈V,E, s, t〉, then another graph G′ = 〈V ′, E′, s′, t′〉 is a sub-
graph of G if both inclusions G′ ⊆ G and V ′ ⊆ V hold, and moreover for each edge
e ∈ E′ the two equations s′(e) = s(e) and t′(e) = t(e) hold. The fact that G′ is a
sub-graph of G is expressed by G′ ⊆ G. If G′ is a sub-graph of G then the obvious
inclusion morphism is written ıG : G′ G. Graphs and graph morphsims congregate
into the category of graphs G.
We will often identify a graph with its carrier and a graph morphism with the
corresponding carrier function.
T. Heindel / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 229 (2009) 97–115 115
